
Myeong-Sook Yoon¹, Israel Fisseha², So-Won Suk³

Abstract

Being the first Refugee law in Asia, the South Korean refugee act was praised by many for taking a stand for refugees and their rights. Nevertheless, despite the intentions of this law, societal and law dynamics up to this point have left South Korea with an unattractive track record when it comes to refugees - high rate of asylum rejection, minimal welfare programs and a perceived discrimination. There is also a fear among civic groups and social welfare organizations working on the human rights protection for refugees that future reform prospects to the refugee act might have a retrogressive effect that would create a more restrictive and difficult situation for refugees. This study analyzed the implementation of the 2013 refugee policy using the policy analysis framework provided by Gilbert and Terrell in 2012. The framework assesses four dimensions of social welfare: users, services, source of funds, and service delivery process. This study laid out the current refugee policy implementation and practice concerns by discussing an updated allocation, provision, delivery and finance issues up to the year 2019. Then, it added a typology of South Korean societal factors that might hinder the progress of present and future refugee protections in the country. Finally, the study points out the remedies for current efforts and mentions the role of civic groups and social welfare organizations in how they bring about change in the future discourse of refugee protection in the country.

Keywords: Less-restrictive Policy, Refugee Policy Analysis, Refugee Protection, Civil Societies, International Norms

1. Introduction

Based on the DEMIG POLICY database that comprises over 6,500 migration policy changes in 45 countries, the nature and evolution of migration policies over the 20th and early 21st centuries show some interesting trends. These findings challenge the common assumption that...
migration policies have become increasingly restrictive over the past decades, and instead demonstrate that since 1945 migration policies have been consistently dominated by changes resulting in less restrictive policies. While entry and integration policies have generally become less restrictive, border control and, since the 1990s, exit policies have become more restrictive[1].

South Korea also belongs to this growing group of less-restrictive countries. The countries' policy evolution regarding refugees and Asylum seekers shows a less-restrictive record since 1993. After South Korea joined the Geneva Convention and its related Protocols in 1992, the country amended the Immigration Control Act in December 1993 and for the first time introduced articles on refugee recognition and related procedures. In 1997 the country devised an integration program for North Korean refugees. Since then, North Koreans who successfully reach South Korea receive special assistance to help them settle and adjust to life in the South - This assistance includes an "adjustment program," which lasts two months, as well as adjustment capital. In 2013 the country eased the asylum procedure by replacing the refugee provisions in the Immigration Control Act - it increases access to status determination by allowing an application to be filed at the port of entry and shortening the maximum period of determining refugee status to six months. The 2013 refugee Act also provided better social and economic rights for refugees and better access to justice for asylum seekers. The distinction between refugees and asylum seekers need to be understood by their distinct visa status. In accordance with the refugee status determination procedure of Korea, recognized refugees (prior asylum seekers) are given an F2 visa which grants them a longer resident visa and employment permissions. However, asylum seekers automatically will be given a G-1-5(asylum applicant visa). This visa restricts the applicant in so many ways that the individual is almost totally dependent on the government system for their livelihood. Since 1993 the number of refugee applications in South Korea has seen a dramatic surge. With expectations of protection, South Korea has become one of the destinations for asylum seekers around the world. Especially after the enactment of the 2013 refugee act, the number of applicants rose from 1,574 applicants in 2013 to 16,173 applicants in 2018[2]. At the same time, the number of cases where applicants filed for administrative litigation after receiving unfavorable decisions has also on the increase. It's been 27 years since South Korea signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. When compared with other countries, South Korea is in the early stages of becoming a host country for refugees from beyond the Korean peninsula. Slowly, the nation is adjusting its approach to refugees away from policies with a disproportionate focus on national security and from the widely held impressions of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous Korean society. South Korea is
also working towards greater harmony with international human rights norms regarding refugees and asylum seekers. There are also critics who say that the global refugee crisis has been a low political priority for the government. Whatever the exact cause or causes of this may be, the nation's refugee acceptance rate remains disgracefully low compared to other member states of OECD. However, North Korean escapees are entitled to favorable relocation policies.

Even with a less restrictive immigration policy model, the country's standing administrative and legal structure is under challenge. While the country has been lauded for its refugee law, the first such law in Asia, it has also been criticized for its high rate of asylum denial, inadequate guarantee on social welfare, and aspects of prejudice that have created discontent among asylum seekers[3]. Most notably, the rate of approval for applicants remains very low in the context of the increasingly high volume of applications. The recent acceptance rate of the country is 3% in 2018. The recognition rate since the enactment of the law was on the decrease until 2016 (from 9.7% to 1%). In 2017 and 2018 there is a slight improvement from 1.5% to 3%[4]. Still, though, this figure is way below the global average of 30% at that time. One of the reasons for this low rate lies in a stringent interpretation of the text in the refugee act, which provides a restrictive and narrow definition of a refugee to be used during the administrative and judicial review processes.

Here we can lay out a set of benchmarks for refugee protection and asylum seeker treatment that a model country should meet. The country will;

- adhere to the principle of non-refoulement of asylum applicant;
- provide the necessary resources for refugee status application and efficient mechanism for initial evaluation;
- will provide humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers at the border;
- will employ an efficient, culturally competent, and fast refugee status determination process. (this process will include proper accommodations and assistance needed);
- systematically ready to provide a path for proper integration and even award citizenship;
- always adhere to the international norms even when its asylum policies are affected by international emergencies.

Adherence to these benchmarks will necessarily challenge the status quo within any refugee host country. It is also important to understand that there are countries that use these ideas for their benefit. Based on the mechanisms a host country uses, a refugee may turn out either to be an economic burden or an opportunity for their host country. This paper is a critical analysis of the actual situation of the refugee protection efforts of South Korea as of 2019. This
The policy analysis method used in this study is a social welfare policy framework conceptualized by Gilbert & Terrell[5]. The framework consists of four dimensions: bases of social allocations, types of social provisions, strategies for the delivery, and financing system. Within these conceptual frames, the policy implementation and practice concerns of the 2013’s refugee act are analyzed. In addition, the dynamics of Korean society with regard to refugees is also added to the analysis.

3. Policy Implementation and Practice Concerns

3.1 Allocation and Provision

The eligibility of refugees and Asylum seekers for social benefits within a host country is always a murky area. They need shelter and accommodation, as well as provision for other basic needs including health, and their children need access to schooling. Those who will be granted refugee status will need access to the labor market to foster their integration and contribution to the host country’s economy. Immediate support to asylum seekers, as well as education and training costs for refugees, require significant upfront investments. But not every host country is fully willing or able to provide refugees with these. It is only through the principle of international consensus and political willingness of refugee-hosting countries these costs may be covered. Thus host countries with proper refugee-friendly systems and socio-political willingness will accede to the UN convention of a global effort of refugee burden-sharing and become a host country. South Korean compliance with the convention could be a result of international pressures regarding international norms. In particular, locally embedded civic organizations and international human rights monitors play roles in pressuring governments to come up with appropriate legal treatment and greater social inclusion of the host country’s small but rapidly growing community of refugees, asylum seekers and other persons of concern.

The refugee Act of South Korea in its Article 31 stipulates a recognized refugee shall be covered by social security at the same level as that of the citizens of the Republic of Korea.
On the surface, a recognized refugee in South Korea is permitted to work, move freely in and out of the country, reunite with spouse and minor children, guaranteed to social security and basic living allowance, permitted to medical care services and health insurance benefits, permitted to send children to elementary and secondary education, and allowed to participate in social integration programs. However, measuring the real effectiveness of this on-paper privileges requires concrete evidence of how much they actually materialized and contributed to the integration of refugees and their families into the wider society.

The Act was celebrated and welcomed by both the international community and local civil society groups as the first law dedicated to serve and provide refugees and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, many of the initial measures by civil society groups and parliamentarians to secure the economic and social interests of refugees and asylum-seekers were excluded from the legislation. As a consequence, many of the leaders of these communities saw the refugee act as merely symbolic, socially limiting, and a disregard for the human rights of the asylum applicants. Korean civil society groups and lawyers began to seek amendments to the law as soon as it first surfaced in 2012[6]. Before the refugee act came into effect, UNHCR also raised a rather fundamental question about the stable residence of refugees. The current law only grants a renewable three-year visa to a recognized refugee by a ministerial ordinance. There was an expectation before its enactment that the refugee act would include permanent residence solutions for refugees, but it didn’t. This may be seen as the fundamental problem for ensuring the full practice of refugees’ legal rights; thus UNHCR suggested that permanent residence should be considered for those recognized as refugees since 2009.

In the case of Asylum seekers, they may receive living support with an extension in exceptional circumstances, followed by a work permit six months after they process the application claim for asylum. But, both financial support and work permits are limited to only six months. Also, applicants and their families are not insured while they are unemployed. Thus gaps in health coverage could threaten the right to life of the refugee claimants, particularly those with no or low income. Above all, it is essential for refugee status applicants who are in critical situations to receive emergency aid support. Currently, unlike recognized refugees, refugee claimants do not fall into the scope of the foreigners of emergency support target groups under Article 1(2) of the Emergency Aid and Support Act.

There is also a doubt how far the current management of the refugee and asylum claimant community is contributing towards the proper integration of refugees into the wider society. Under the current management system, the refugee reception center at Yeongjong island is criticized for being isolated from mainstream society. Such a structural limitation could delay
refugee contact with Korean society and make a more difficult adjustment to the new environment. After six months of staying at the center, refugees need to resettle in local communities, but there are challenges to getting jobs due to the high barriers to the labor market, and this hampers their ability to make an independent living. Therefore, providing refugees with additional vocational and integration programs at the Immigration and Foreigner Support Center may be one way to allow refugees to be more easily integrated into Korean society.

The adoption of the new Act is a great step by itself but not fully implementing its initiatives will endanger the rights, security, and livelihood of refugees and asylum claimants. Since the Act's enactment, the ministry of justice has been criticized for its reluctance to fully implement the initiatives for refugee protection. This could be seen throughout the parliamentary debates over the bill[7]. Refugees or Asylum seekers have a basic assumption that their minimum rights in South Korea are to be protected as it is stipulated in the refugee convention. True provision and fulfillment of welfare programs nevertheless were fully dependent upon domestic acts and decrees that authorize the allocation and execution of the budget and human resources of government agencies. Although the refugee convention urges refugee-hosting countries to provide social protections, the Korean Ministry of Justice, the governmental body in charge of refugee affairs, has a great discretion in providing refugee status applicants with a living allowance, housing facilities with ensured freedom of movement, elementary and secondary education of minor refugee applicants, and Korean language training[8]. Recognized refugees also lack proper welfare provisions. Different types of social adjustment programs are provided under the discretionary power of the Ministry of Justice who has the power to implement the refugee convention as they see fit. So, if these social provisions are the reflection of policy values, it is also possible to trace these policy values from which welfare regime they came from. Understanding the type of welfare regime, although crudely, would help to predict current and future intentions of a welfare provision towards refugees or immigrants in general.

In the study of the rights of different types of immigrants, the types of welfare regime (liberal, conservative, or social democratic) determine the type and quality of welfare provision an immigrant or a refugee is entitled to[9]. Every welfare regime will technically benefit its citizens before any type of immigrant. However, within the conventions of these three welfare regimes refugees and their rights are usually on par with those of citizens. In other words, refugees are rightfully in an equal stance with a citizen when it comes to accessing welfare provisions. In contrast with this, the rights of Asylum seekers in these regimes vary from
having weak privileges to having no right at all.

Along these lines, it is necessary to note that precisely where South Korea's welfare typology falls among the above welfare regimes remains a point of contention. Not only South Korea, but the early generation of the East Asian developmental states, including Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are deemed to have a hybrid of liberal and conservative social policy models[10]. Their "developmental state" political economy also avoided protective social welfare typology and adopted productivist welfare capitalism. The productivist context of welfare is not concerned with the promotion of social rights per se, but rather the promotion of economic productivity[11]. Productivist welfare capitalism not only becomes the "distinctive characteristic" for East Asia's (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, & Singapore) social policy development focus but it is also a foundation for their social control. Productivist view welfare as labor production, human capital accumulation, and rapid economic growth (Kim, 2015). If South Korea's welfare regime falls under productivist welfare capitalism, it would explain why the immigrants and refugees filling the 3D (Dirty, Difficult, and Demeaning) job spots. These are the "unwanted job spots" either by their working terms and condition or their payment arrangements.

Considering the actual situation in South Korea, Welfare provision for refugees or immigrants is not a matter of rights at this point. At issue is not the capability of the economy to provide for these outsiders, but instead the political willingness of players in the economy to cut them some slack. Thus, given the current socio-political dynamics of the country, in this case, will only come down to these questions: Are Korean social policy's priorities and imperatives regarding refugees working against the very aim of resettling and protecting the refugee?

3.2 Service Delivery

In the immigration office, especially regarding service delivery for Asylum seekers and refugees, cultural competence is the basic requirement for immigration officers. Cultural competence composes cognitive components like awareness, attitude, knowledge, and skill[12]. At the early stage of service delivery for refugees and asylum seekers, it is imperative that a practitioner is culturally competent to accommodate the needs of these people. It is also expected that the human right approach is and should be the basis for any kind of policy developments and any type of services. Again in its nature, the human right supporting approach is proved and recognized as a foundation for any type of sound cross-cultural practice[13]. Service providers should also include interpreters, trained cross-cultural support workers, and ongoing training

...according to changing circumstances.

Unfortunately, however, the need for language interpreters and the lack thereof in South Korea’s refugee status determination process is mentioned in Lee & Choi’s study. The study mentioned the growing number of asylum applications submitted in South Korea and the refugee act (2013) call for a system for the provision of professional interpreting services and the training of interpreters for the asylum process[14].

Since states have primary responsibility for the determination of status of the asylum seeker according to international standards, South Korea’s Refugee status (RSD) is the first legal phase for an asylum seeker to be recognized as a refugee. This administrative framework will determine whether a person seeking international protection is a refugee under international, regional or national law. With the help of Korean civic groups to urge the country to abide by international standards, the RSD process focuses on meeting the needs of refugees. Nonetheless, according to a recent report on the refugee screening process, it is still possible to see a void that will routinely jeopardize the well-being of refugees. The country’s RSD assessment agency is short staffed as it has 38 refugee advising officers across the nation. Until 31 December 2018, 19,931 applicants are awaiting the results of the RSD and their case will be examined by these 38 officers[15].

Generally, the issues of the process of determining the classification of refugees are very closely linked to the systemic inadequacy of the immigration system. Officers who are there to look into the situations of the claimants are said to be overworked and not to have adequate room to go through each individual case[16]. Indeed, the problem lies within the ill awareness of the officers as to the major push factors that the claimant came up with; ‘a detailed understanding of internal unrest in the country’ — power structure, dictatorship, ruling tribe, biased media and gender issues’. In one incident that happened last year, for instance, an Egyptian asylum seeker who fled to South Korea from political oppression said the Korean translation of his interview in the RSD process differed from what he originally said. The transcript, posted online by one Center for Refugee Rights, stated he came for legal status to work and earn money and didn’t fear any persecution upon his return to Egypt. He was denied asylum and immediately appealed the decision but was rejected by the immigration office based on the translated interview transcript. The same center also found 19 similar cases of mistranslated refugee screening interviews last year. A Seoul-based civic group discovered "fake translations" occurred frequently in screening interviews of those from Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Egypt.

Other civil society organizations like NANCEN (a legal support organization for refugees and
Asylum seekers also pointed out applicants would lose their chance to fight for their case just because of such inaccurate translations. Those who enter the country in need of protection go through interviews with immigration officials. Applicants are asked for the reasons they left their native countries and the dangers they would face upon returning. The interview records serve as important evidence in determining their refugee status. However, some interpreters for lesser-used languages, like Arabic, are not qualified enough to offer an accurate translation. They often miss important details of refugees' stories and the misinterpretation ends in their rejection.

In another case, a Yemeni man was also rejected based on a questioned translation. He filed a lawsuit and during trials, attorneys said the translation was fabricated by an immigration official and an interpreter. Afterward, the Justice Ministry, which oversees immigration officials who conduct the interviews, ultimately canceled its rejection of the Yemeni refugee and he was reunited with his wife and children.

In the current context of South Korea, cross-cultural communication training for officers involved in refugee and asylum-seeker cases and a willingness to broadly understand cultural differences is vital.

### 3.3 Finance

Within the debate of accepting refugees or concerning their cost within a host country, people and government operate through interwoven and competing narratives of nationalism, compassion, religion, identity, and terrorism. At the end of these debates, how many refugees each nation should resettle, or the extent to which each nation's borders should be open or closed will be decided. Arguments that strongly reference nationalism, identity, and terrorism tend to view refugees as a mere economic burdens. Religious arguments are also biased by similarity in religious beliefs, considering the cost incurred for refugees which are different from their religion as a burden.

These arguments apply to the situation in South Korea, and the prevalence of some arguments over others will shape South Korea future image as a country friendly or hostile to refugees. From 2013, the Korean Government's Ministry of Justice has been spending money as a response to the needs of refugee applicants and institutional capacity building. For instance, 2019's budget refugees are around 2,482,327$[17]. Out of this budget, roughly 65% of it is spent on capacity building of the ministry and the rest will go to the refugees directly. The budget also excludes more than half of the refugee applicants in the country. For instance,
Fundamental health examination for refugee applicants is provided for 3500 refugee applicants while there are around 9500 refugee applicants in the country. The cost of living for refugee applicants also covers the cost of 523 applicants only and the medical expense was budgeted for 280 applicants.

The state budget for subsidizing asylum seekers in need of necessities has always been tight. From 2018’s budget the National Assembly also slashed 350 million won ($308,000) from the refugee budget bill proposed by the justice ministry. 2018’s annual state budget for asylum seekers included 3 billion won for operating the Immigration Reception Center on Yeongjongdo Island in Incheon, where asylum seekers stay while waiting for the completion of their application’s evaluation, and 800 million won for the subsidy pool. Considering that the number of asylum seekers in Korea was over 43,000 as of July this year, the pool is too small to support them all[18]. The actual reality of most refugees’ situations in South Korea is that they are far from being a burden to the country. Most of the Refugees and asylum applicants are financing themselves in the country by supplementing the neglected job slots (3D jobs). It is recommended that the Korean government to do better in allocating more aid to the refugees, beyond covering the administrative costs of processing them.

What could be deducted from all this thus, of course, there is a cost hosting the refugees in the country but there is also an indication that most of the refugees are bearing their own cost while living in Korea. In other words, unless otherwise there is a direct provision from elsewhere, these refugees are financing their settlement costs. It is advisable to enhance the system by which refugees could be able to engage economically to cover their costs.

4. Concerns within Korean Society

4.1 The Public Sentiment over Refugees

In June 2018, around 500 Yemeni refugees who entered South Korea through Jeju Island by means of the visa-free system made headlines in Korean major media outlets. Due to this incident, the wider Korean society sentiment was revealed. Again due to this incident the few Refugees who were almost "invisible" within the Korean society were forced to become "visible".

The overall societal sentiment towards the arrival of Yemeni refugees was overwhelmingly negative. In 700,000 individual petitions, many Koreans expressed a strong desire for these refugees to go back to their country, despite the fact that they had fled war in their home
countries.

Restrictive policy intentions or negative attitudes towards outsiders by the majority are manifestations of economic downturns. When citizens struggle with their contingencies, they are sensitive to perceived external threats. However, negative public sentiment is not always rooted in economics. Some societies align themselves with more restrictive asylum and immigration solely for reasons of avoiding diversity and a fear of foreign values.

Recalling the context of last year’s refugee hatred in Korea, it would be helpful to explore the various possible sources of anti-refugee attitudes in South Korea. Korea is a society in which migrants are not considered to be members of society due to the importance of a national identity based on Korean ethnicity. This fragile status of migrants as outsiders has become more evident when the general public expressed its abhorrence towards the Yemeni refugees. Without any tangible evidence, these refugees were labeled as potential sex offenders, dangerous terrorists and bogus refugees, who may pose a threat to Korean women. The petition that followed to the effect of the deportation of up to 700,000 refugees and the sentiment for the abolition of the refugee act showed that there is great resistance among some members of Korean society to creating a place for refugees in Korea.

First, xenophobia is an extension of the context in which minority hatred occurs in South Korea. In Korean society, discrimination against minority groups has manifested in the form of hatred accompanied by active anger. Refugee hatred is the latest example of a growing hatred of members of minority groups in recent years. The refugees are the most perfect "target" for this hatred since they have no prior connections to mainstream Korean society. They don’t necessarily adhere to the "status quo" that ties together mainstream Korean society. Since they are outside the concentric circle that makes up Korean society, refugees or “outsiders” are weak and can be overshadowed or deleted at any time.

Second, the vulnerability and typology of refugees are also grounds for xenophobia. The change in Korean society, which emphasizes efficiency rather than equality amid rapid economic development, has emerged as a winner-take-all, deficit-sustaining form where excellence, victory, and strength are admired, while "weakness" itself has become a cover for contempt that should be actively ostracized. In this context, the logic of refugee support, which claims vulnerability itself as a basis for protection, can easily be met with disgust or rejection.

Third, strong unity and national identity in Korean society are also grounds for xenophobia. Korean society has never understood the active value of "diversity" and within that, there is ignorance of other cultures. The Yemeni-flagged refugees were not "victims who need protection from the devastation of war," but rather "suspicious men who could commit sexual

crimes against Korean women at any time and who could commit terrorist crimes against unspecified people at any time." The South Korean government, too, has played into this narrative by first restricting the release of refugees from Jeju Island, and second sympathizing with those who hold these stereotypes. Fundamentally, the societal wellspring of such fearsome prejudices is the general ignorance of other cultures among Koreans.

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 The Way Forward

Less restrictive immigration laws impliedly create an option for any asylum claimant to enter the country. Less restrictive immigration laws of South Korea also imply a preparedness to deal with different types of immigrants and their respective cases. As the issues of refugees and asylum seekers are sensitive in its nature, dealing with the global refugee crisis requires not only less restriction but a delicate understanding of the dynamics that made them displaced in the first place.

The way ahead for refugee rights protection in South Korea first and foremost will require a political relaxation and genuine approach towards the global refugee crisis and the livelihood of refugees and asylum seekers within its borders. The future of refugee protection in South Korea is thus dependent on the appreciation of the current implementation of the refugee act. The current implementation of the refugee act, given the overall political will, only creates a "host country" for asylum claimants, and relegates them to making a precarious living. The political aim shouldn't be making the country less restrictive, but it should extend to integrating the refugee to the extent of granting full citizenship.

Institutionalized application of the text and bureaucratic practices with short review periods to simplify the task for the government and courts ultimately results in making the refugee act an empty promise for asylum seekers. Thus, the text in the Refugee Convention must be read and interpreted in the spirit and context of its object and purpose[19]. In addition, because asylum claims are currently being found to be lacking in credibility in a majority of cases in South Korean courts[20]. It is thus critical to raise the importance of the principle of 'the benefit of the doubt' in credibility assessments of asylum claims, as is recommended by the Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status[21].

The next important aspect that will be needed in service delivery is cultural sensitivity. Cultural sensitivity is being aware that cultural differences and similarities between people exist
without assigning them a value-positive or negative, better or worse, right or wrong. Especially in the refugee status determination process, the individual case of an asylum claimant should be treated without any bias. It is also recommended for the status determination body to increase its number of specialized staff and to be culturally competent at the same time.

Initially financing the cost of refugees and asylum seekers should be the government’s responsibility for all refugees, and should then take into account the extent to which said refugees are economically capable of financing their own costs. However, this initial cost is legitimized only through compassionate (humanitarian stance) argument that humanitarian objectives are much more important than costs incurred. This argument flows from Article 14 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations, 1948). As a Signatory country, it is expected from South Korea to devise a better integration framework that would eventually enable the refugees not only to stand on their feet but also could contribute to the economy.

5.2 The Role of Civil Societies

This hatred of refugees, which has emerged in overlapping historical, political, religious and social contexts, is not the voice of the majority. However, in a Korean society, where the context of sympathy, solidarity, and hospitality strangely does not exist, some strong abhorrence has quickly spread to many citizens, even though most of the members have memories of being refugees or similar categories in the past. It has been a powerful challenge for civil society activists to respond, who have focused only on the legal rights of refugees and the refugee policy itself, and who have not had the opportunity to fully contemplate and inform the social position of refugees.

Under these circumstances, what should be the role of civil society? The domestic tasks that should be delivered in the context of Korea are as follows: First, the government should play a role. There should be a clear stance and attitude of the current government. In other words, it is necessary to establish a clear policy stance and deliver messages to the effect that "refugees are not subjected to hate or discrimination". In the long run, an understanding of refugees in addition to ‘multicultural education’ should be added to the curriculum within the basic immigration policy plan or the new refugee policy framework. The government should also consider introducing various laws to regulate anti-refugee sentiment and clarify the ministry in charge of them.

Second, there must be a public relations strategy for pro-refugee citizen activists. As for ultra-rightist groups that actively generate hatred for refugees based on political considerations, the government should isolate them by emphasizing that it is unreasonable to break the conditions of coexistence in society and take active action against fake news and documents generated and distributed by far-right groups. Many citizens, who may be affected by the voice of ultra-rightist groups due to their familiarity with refugees, should be actively informed about them from a long-term perspective.

Third, there must be an expansion of active solidarity. Civic groups must continue to make fundamental proposals for establishing the social position of refugees, and more actively fight against such things as discrimination, homogeneity, hatred, racism, and other cultural exclusion. In addition to solidarity in the field of migrant refugees, the expansion of solidarity such as solidarity with anti-discrimination activists, solidarity with professors and researchers of various departments to build meaningful research, and the discovery of lawmakers and politicians who will speak from the perspective of pro-objects and amend the law without being affected by the far-right voice. The question of the existence of refugees as permanent members of society, should be broadened through the expansion of a diverse consensus.

The international alliance should also be expanded to continue fighting anti-refugee sentiment and discrimination itself. Since 2015, far-right politicians based on anti-immigrant sentiment have been expanding in various places as well as in Europe. Unlike in the past, when there was no position in the refugee policy itself, politicians' opinions and positions on refugee policy are becoming the standard of choice for voters. If such a phenomenon is left unchecked and the government focuses on improving the system, the whole movement for the protection of refugees could be overturned. The Asia-Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRN) and various regional human rights networks that put refugees on the agenda should not only emphasize the rights of refugees, design the refugee system, and prevent forced repatriation, but also establish and accumulate discussions on the urgent and desperate fight against refugee hatred in the context of each country and cooperate with various international alternatives against discrimination. Taking lessons from such examples as World Refugee Day, which has staged events within individual countries, and Elimination of Racial Discrimination Day, civic groups in South Korea need to consider large-scale campaigns with the same persuasiveness and charm. Events such as these can build solidarity and provide a forum for citizens to speak out against anti-refugee attitudes and the forced repatriation of refugees taking place both in South Korea and in other countries around the world.
References


[7] National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, The Minutes of 6 Legislation and Judiciary Committee (The First Sub-Committee on the Review of Bills), the 289th National Assembly (Temporary Session), (2010), Apr 28; Seoul, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea


